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STATUS OF THE CASE 
The Claimant is again thankful for the legal privilege and her right to make an appeal of 
her case to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The Claimant recalls that she is again aware of the standard of appellant review-that this 
Court exercises free legal review over legal conclusions, but will not set aside any finding of fact 
that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Excell Construction, Inc., v. State 
Department of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 116 P 3d 18, (Idaho App, 2005). 
She is also aware that if the Commission does not make a correct and proper application 
of the law in regards to the evidence on record, this Court can overturn the erroneous conclusion. 
Blayney v. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P 2d 972 (1986). 
The Claimant has submitted substantial and competent evidence in her Appellant 
Opening Brief and this Appellant Reply Brief to the Idaho Supreme Court which she contends 
supports her legal appeal that the Industrial Commission's conclusions regarding her case are 
erroneous and are not supported by the evidence standard of this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's in their Responsive Brief to this Court assert that this Appeal is "nothing 
but the Claimant's disagreement with the Commission's determinations and conclusions and that 
she has asked the Court to do nothing more than reweigh the evidence and corn~ to a different 
conclusion, one that is favorable to the Claimant this time." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 28 ). 
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Part of this is true-yes the Claimant does not agree with the Commission's conclusions 
in regards to the evidence submitted. However, as to any disrespect for this Court to "simply 
rehash the facts" is an assumption and accusation by the Defendant's that is incorrect. 
May this Court first respectfully consider the following "generalities submitted as fact" 
by the Defendant's in their Idaho Supreme Court Responsive Brief. 
• That the Claimant has asked the Court to do nothing more than reweigh the evidence and 
come to a different conclusion. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 28 ). 
• The true fact--one example is that the Claimant has offered legal compelling evidence in 
her Supreme Court Appellant Brief from Judge Molleur/ Administrative Law Judge with 
Social Security/regarding her disability that was not considered in her Industrial 
Commission hearing. ( S.C. App. Opening Brief, p. 26, 33, 34, 35 ). 
• That the Claimant filed her Appeal to the Supreme Court solely based upon her 
disagreement with the Commission's determination of the weight given to the facts 
presented and conclusions drawn from those facts, rather than upon legal error. ( S.C. 
Def. Resp. Brief, p. 28 ). 
• The true fact is that Claimant has referenced numerous legal decisions in her Opening 
Brief to this Court that she contends supports her legal appeal for overturning the 
Industrial Commission's erroneous conclusions to her case. ( S.C. App. Opening Brief). 
Additional Argument Concerning the Erroneous Generalities Offered as Fact in the 
Defendant's Responsive Brief Statements of Fact to the Idaho Supreme Court 
The Defendant's submitted the identical Statement of Facts in both the Defendant's 
Response Brief before the Industrial Commission and in the their Responsive Brief to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. (LC.Def. Resp. Brief, p. 3-10)( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 7-14). 
The Claimant respects this Courts concern with a "rehashing of the facts" but would 
respectfully ask this Court to review the Claimant's Opening Brief and Response Brief to the 
Industrial Commission. The Claimants legal contention is that the Defendant's are again 
submitting these "generalities as fact" to this Court. 
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This Court has asserted that when generalities are considered as fact, particularly when a 
factual issue is closely contended, a case should be reconsidered to the fact finder for 
reconsideration of relevant issues without errors. Kele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho 
681,905 P2d 82 (Idaho App 1995). If the Commission's conclusions are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence they are not binding and conclusive. Dean v. Dravo Corp., 
97 Idaho 158,161,540 P .2d 1337, 1340 (1975). 
The Claimant is again respectful of the right to submit her case to the Idaho Supreme 
Court and to offer further argument in this her Appellant Reply Brief in support of her appeal. 
Additional Argument as to Why: 
I. The Claimant respectfully contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law or 
abused their discretion when they did not make a correct and proper application of 
the law to the evidence submitted when they concluded that the Claimant was 
medically stable on and after November 21, 2007 (MMI date) 
The Defendant's assert in their Responsive Brief to this Court that in regards to the issue 
of the opined MMI date given by Dr. Greenwald-"that there was no contrary contemporary 
medical evidence on this issue and even if there were, the Commission is free to determine 
which medical evidence to give weight to." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 20 ). 
In contention to this quote "factual assertion" by the Defendant's that there was "no 
contrary contemporary medical evidence on this issue" -- the Claimant would submit the 
following evidence: 
Dr. Krafft, MD in his Independent Medical Examination Report on August 9, 2007 stated 
that the examinee (Claimant) has "not reached maximum medical improvement (MMI)." ( Cl. 
Ex. F/Dr. Krafft/Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinic. 08/09/2007, p.11 ). 
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On July 31, 2008 Dr. Roy Frizzell MD, Ph.D stated that he had reviewed the three lumbar 
MRI's. "I am in agreement with the interpretation. It is my medical opinion, on a more probable 
than not basis, Ms. Shubert's (Claimant) ongoing left-sided low back, left hip and left leg 
symptoms are related to her fall on May, 1, 2006." Dr. Frizzell further stated, "I do not believe 
that Ms. Shubert (Claimant) is at maximum medical improvement at this time." (Cl.Ex. F/Dr. 
Frizzell. 07/31/2008. p. 3, 4 ). Dr. Frizzell made this expert medical opinion regarding the 
Claimant's MMI status almost a full year after Dr. Krafft's. 
The Claimant is aware that the Court is not interested in a "rehashing of the facts"; 
however, per the Court "if the findings of the Commission are not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, they are not binding and conclusive and should be appealed for review." 
Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161,540 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1975). 
The Defendant's assert-"that there was no contrary contemporary medical evidence on 
this issue and even if there were, the Commission is free to determine which medical evidence to 
give weight to." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 20 ). 
The witness credibility standard set by the Court is whether the expert witness has 
reviewed all the relevant medical records. The Commission could decide not to give credibility 
to an expert where the expert had failed to review all the relevant medical records. Mazzone v. 
Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750,302, P .3d 718 (2013). 
The Claimant wishes to note that Dr. Frizzell stated that he had the opportunity to take a 
history from the examinee (Claimant), reviewed the records and reviewed the imaging studies of 
Ms. LuAnn Shubert (Claimant). (Cl.Ex. F/Dr. Roy Frizzell. 07/31/2008. p. 1 ). 
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Referee Power's stated regarding Dr. Frizzell's expert medical opinion--"that at best Dr. 
Frizzell's statement causally connecting the Claimant's complaints to the industrial accident is 
incomplete in its analysis; at worst it is simply an unsupported conclusion." ( R., p. 20 ). 
The Court affirms that the "role of the Commission referee is that of a "finder of fact" 
and "not a medical expert" and that permitting a referee to exceed his or her role as finder of fact 
underlies the legal purpose of the Industrial Commission's proceedings to accommodate 
Claimants and promote justice in simple proceedings." Hagler, 118 Idaho 599, 798 P.2d 58 
(1990). 
Again the Court has held that the referee "must accept as true the positive, 
uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless this testimony is inherently improbable or 
rendered so by facts and circumstances at the hearing or trial." Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 
58 Idaho 438,447, 72 P 2d 171, 175 (1937). 
The Claimant contends that Referee Powers abused his legal discretion as "finder of fact" 
and made erroneous conclusions in regards to the submitted factual expert medical testimony of 
Dr. Frizzell concerning the Claimant's complaints that he (Dr. Frizzell) states are casually related 
to her work-related injury. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P3d 1238 (2002). 
The Commission cannot just "take notice of whatever it likes"-the Court affirms that 
"witnesses are still necessary." Pomerinke, 124 Idaho at 306, 859 P .2d at 342: Hite, 96 Idaho at 
72, 524 P .2d at 533. 
The Defendent's also contend that "none of them opined she (Claimant) was in a period 
of recovery." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 24 ). 
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Since Dr. Frizzell opined Ms. Shubert (the Claimant) was not MMI-she therefore was 
medically in a "period of recovery" because she was not medically stable. ( CL Ex. F /Dr. Roy 
Frizzell. 07/31/2008. p. 4 ) 
The Claimant wishes to offer this true analysis-one person may describe a "particular 
apple" as "a red or green round fruit that you can eat" while another person may describe the 
same apple as "a shiny red, green, or green-red delicious juicy edible fruit." Both statements 
correctly describe the "same apple" even though different words are used. 
The Claimant asserts that simply because her submitted expert medical and personal 
testimony statements do not say the exact five words "in a period of recovery" -that in her 
offered witness evidence they still describe the medical and personal condition she is 
experiencing regarding her ongoing pain and eventual disability from her work-related injury. 
When they state that the Claimant is "not MMI-medically stable"--they are either describing 
the Claimant's condition as "in a period of recovery" or "disability" because she certainly 
cannot be in both MMI and in a state of recovery at the same time. 
Judge Molleur stated "after careful review of the entire record the undersigned finds that 
the claimant has been disabled from November 25, 2008." ( Cl. Ex. D, p. I ). 
Dr. John Casper, MD on June 11, 2009, based upon his examination of the Claimant ( 
Ms. Shubert) opined that the Claimant should not lift more than 25 lbs. More significantly, he 
opined that "she would have difficulties in prolonged standing and walking due to her low back 
pain." Judge Molleur found in his expert medical opinion that such an inability to stand or walk 
for prolonged period is not consistent with exertion above the sedentary level. Therefore, the 
undersigned (Judge Molleur) accords Dr. Casper's findings significant weight. (Cl.Ex. D, p.5 ). 
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Dr. Casper's expert medical opinion regarding the Claimant's condition on June 11, 2009 
certainly describes the Claimant as less than medically stable-"she would have difficulties in 
prolonged standing and walking due to her low back pain." ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 5). Let it also be noted 
Dr. Casper did offer additional restrictions. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 5 ). Therefore, it is contended although 
Dr. Casper did not use the term "period of recovery"-he certainly did not describe her condition 
as medically stable-therefore she had to be in a "period of recovery or disability." Id. 
The Claimant contends that her additional submitted evidence supports her legal appeal 
to this Court that she was not MMI rather that she was in a state of recovery since her work-
related injury on May 1, 2006 up to November 25, 2008-the date Judge Molleur opined that she 
was disabled as a result of her work-related injury. (Cl.Ex. D. p. 1 ). 
The Defendant's again bring up the issues of physical therapy and steroid injections. 
(S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 19 ). 
The Defendant's bring up the physical therapy issue when they assert that "she" (the 
Claimant) had stopped physical therapy at Hands On because she did not feel like it was helping 
and requested an MRI or CAT scan. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 19 ). 
In regards to the these erroneous "statements" by the Defendant's let it be noted that in 
Dr. Greenwald' s clinical notes for November 1, 2007 she wrote in regards to Hands On physical 
therapy that "the patient (Ms. Shubert) went "eight times and no-showed one" and she has 
"worsening symptoms"(inserted-certainly does not describe "medical stability"). In Dr. 
Greenwald's own clinical report under Recommendations--she (Dr. Greenwald) notes: "Stop 
physical therapy; it is not helping." ( Def. Ex. G, p. 84). There is no reference by Dr. Greenwald 
whatsoever that the Claimant stopped physical therapy with Hands On. 
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The Defendant's assert that "she (the Claimant) had stopped" physical therapy at Hands 
On because she did not feel like it was helping and requested an MRI or CAT scan." It is 
important to note that even Referee Powers stated in regards to same appointment between the 
Claimant and Dr. Greenwald on November 1, 2007 that "Dr. Greenwald agreed to stop physical 
therapy, since it was not helping." ( R., p.14, par. 24). 
In Dr. Greenwald's clinic notes (approximately 3 weeks later) dated November 21, 2007, 
she (Dr. Greenwald) notes "Hands On Therapy was not beneficial and caused worsening pain." 
"She (Ms. Shubert) and I (Dr. Greenwald)" decided to stop. ( Def. Ex. G, p. 85 ). 
Dr. Greenwald notes in her discussion regarding the diagnostic epidural injection "just to 
see if S 1 is the issue"-she (Ms. Shubert) absolutely refused it. Her sister and mother had "side 
effects in the past from epidural injections so she has no interest it." ( Def. Ex. G, p.86 ). 
Whenever a needle passes near nerves and the spinal cord, nerve damage and infection is a 
possible risk. 
As to the benefit of steroid injections, Dr. Lossman opined that "she may or may not 
benefit from epidural steroid injections." ( Def. Ex. E, p.65 ). In regards to the "epidural steroid 
injections"-she (the Claimant) had a trial spine stimulator inserted into her back in 
approximately November 2008 which is certainly a more complicated and invasive surgery that 
epidural steroid injections (which the Claimant's reasoning for her refusal has been fully 
discussed). (Def.Ex. G, p. 86 )( CL Ex. B/Dr. Sandra Thompson /Aetna. p. 42-50 ). 
The Claimant's legal issue with the Defendant's above erroneous assertions is that they 
are offered as fact. This Court does review questions of fact only to determine whether 
substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 
128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). 
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The Defendant's in their Defendant's Responsive Brief to this Court interestingly remind 
the Court that when the Claimant reported to Dr. Greenwald on November 2, 2007 "she stated 
that she (the Claimant) was "having worsening left buttock and left leg pain resulting from 
physical therapy. Her low back pain was also worsening and starting to burn; she had cramping 
in the left lower leg, worsening at the end of the day, consistent pain in the left angle, and groin 
pain still." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p.19 ). Dr. Greenwald did not state that the Claimant was 
MMI on this occasion-when the Claimant described her pain in her left buttock, left leg, 
burning, cramping, and worsening pain. Therefore, the Claimant must be in a "state of recovery." 
It has also already been addressed in the Appellant Opening Brief to this Court that "on 
the very day" Dr. Greenwald opined that the Claimant was MMI (November 21, 2007), the 
Claimant listed her concerns to find out why she still has a lot and "even worse pain;" that she 
wanted to get it fixed so there is no more pain, and that she can't bend over. ( Def. Ex. G, p. 
86a). The Claimant had reported similar worsening pain symptoms from her work-related injury 
only three weeks earlier to Dr. Greenwald-"yet this time she (Dr. Greenwald) opines the 
Claimant was medically stable." The Claimant, however, was again certainly not describing a 
medical stable condition in her patient report to Dr. Greenwald. ( Def. Ex. G, p. 86a ) 
The Defendant's argue that this Court exercises free review over questions of law, but not 
over questions of fact. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 18 ). The Defendant's also assert that the 
Commission is the ultimate judge of the credibility of witnesses and that it is the function of the 
Commission and not of this Court to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the 
assigned testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record as a whole. ( S.C. 
Def. Resp. Brief, p. 18, 19 ). 
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While it may be the Commissions function to determine the credibility of witnesses--per 
the Court "it becomes the duty of the board to make full and exhaustive inquiry.'' Lay v. Idaho 
State Sch. & Colony, 64 Idaho 455,462, 133 P.2d 923,926 (1943). As to the Court's rule 
applicable to "all witness testimony'': 
In a 1937 worker's compensation case, this Court stated: 
The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an action 
is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted 
testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable, or 
rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial. Manley v. Harvey 
Lumber Co., 174 Minn. 489,221 N.W. 913,914. In Jeffrey v. Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 50 
P.2d 872, 874, it is held that neither the trial court nor a jury may arbitrarily or 
capriciously disregard the testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes 
known to the law, if such testimony does not exceed probability. 
In Mazzone, the Court held that the Commission could decide not to give credibility to a 
expert medical opinion where the expert had failed to review all of the relevant medical records. 
Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718 (2013). 
The Claimant again contends that the Referee Power's erred as a matter of law and 
abused his discretion when he excluded at her hearing Exhibit D (her Social Security 
Administration claim of disability) and Exhibit E (personal witness testimonies). ( Tr., p. 14, L. 
9-25;p.15,L.1-17:p.16,L.9-25). 
When the Claimant's Exhibit Dis reviewed in light of this Court's witness credibility 
standard, it fulfills this legal standard because Administrative Law Judge Molleur "asserted that 
after careful review of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the Claimant has been 
disabled from November 25, 2008." ( Cl. Ex. D, p. l ). In addition to this the Claimant had 
offered credible and substantial personal witness testimony in her Exhibit E that also supports 
her legal contention before this Court that she was not MMI on and after November 21, 2007. 
(Cl. Ex. E, p. 1-3 ). 
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The Claimant responds to this asserted "witness credibility" by the Defendant's and notes 
the Court's ruling is that the Referee and Commission "must accept as true the positive, 
uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless this testimony is inherently improbable, or 
rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial." Pierstorff v. Gray's 
Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447, 72 P 2d 171, 175 (1937). 
The Commission cannot just "take notice of whatever it likes"-the Court affirms that 
"witnesses are still necessary." Pomerinke, 124 Idaho at 306, 859 P .2d at 342: Hite, 96 Idaho at 
72, 524 P .2d at 533. 
Additionally the Claimant asserts that in her Appellant Opening Brief to this Court she 
submitted a preponderance of substantial and competent "contrary and contemporary" evidence 
that showed that she was not MMI on November 21, 2007 as concluded by the Commission. 
( R., p. 23 ). 
The Claimant respectfully asks the Court to consider the following submitted evidence in 
her Appellant Brief to this Court regarding her MMI status because of her legal contention with 
the Defendant's erroneous assertion "that was no contrary contemporary medical evidence on 
this issue." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 20 ). The Claimant's Appellant Brief notes: 
• Judge Molleur's impartial legal and expert medical opinion where he stated on March 29, 
2011: ( p. 12) 
1) The onset of her disability was produced by a work-related injury when she tripped 
and fell on May 1, 2006 ( p. 12, 13) 
2) Since that time she has complained of radiating pain down the back of her leg 
( p. 13) 
3) Dr. Schwartsman opined on June 26, 2008 that she has annual tears L4-5 which 
correlated with the location of the Claimant's symptoms ( p. 13) 
11 
4) After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned (Judge Molleur) finds that 
the Claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to 
produce the alleged symptoms ( p. 13) 
5) That the statement concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these 
symptoms are generally credible ( p. 13) 
6) Claimant described a lifestyle significantly limited by pain (since her work-related 
injury on May 1, 2006) ( p. 13) 
7) She has undergone numerous conservative and invasive treatment modalities ... 
without relief ( p. 13) 
8) Dr. Frizzell a neurosurgeon opined that she was not a surgical candidate ( p. 13 ) 
9) Inconsistency of the State agency medical consultant's physical assessment to the 
medical records ( p. 13, 14) 
10) Statements provided by Inga Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry Woods, although not 
medically trained, these statements provide insight into the severity of the claimant's 
impairments and how those impairments affect the claimant's ability to function. As 
such, the undersigned accords great weight to these statements ( p. 30 )( Cl. Ex. E, p. 1-3) 
11) Regarding the Claimant's disability-"fully favorable" ( p. 12) 
12) Judge Molleur opined she had been disabled from November 25, 2008 ( p. 12) 
• Dr. Schwartsman opined on June 26, 2008 that she has radiating pain down the back of 
the leg and into the lateral calf and into the foot. .. I do feel that the majority of her 
symptoms are coming from her lumbar spine specifically the annular tear. This correlates 
with the dermatormal location of her pain. ( p. 4 )( LC. Cl. Opening Brief, p. 5) 
• Dr. Roy Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. opined on July 31, 2008 that the Claimant's ongoing left-
sided low back, left hip, and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006 ( p. 
15 ) 
• Dr. Roy Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. opined on July 31, 2008 that "I do not believe Ms. Shubert 
(Claimant) is at maximum medical improvement at this time ( p. 15) 
• Dr. John Casper expert medical opined regarding his examination of the Claimant on 
June 11, 2009 that the Claimant would have difficulties in prolonged standing and 
walking due to her low back pain ( p. 13 ) 
• Anne F. Aastum, an impartial vocational expert testified at the Claimant's Social Security 
Hearing on February 16, 2011 that the Claimant retains the residual functional capacity 
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for only sedentary work, the demands of the claimant's past relevant work exceed her 
residual functional capacity ( p. 33) 
In regards to the Defendant's statement that "even if there were, the "Commission is 
free" to determine which medical evidence to give weight to." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 20 ). 
The Court has again affirmed that the role of the Commission is that of "finder of fact" 
and not a medical expert and that permitting a referee to exceed his or her role as finder of fact 
underlies the legal purpose of the Industrial Commissions proceedings to accommodate 
claimants and promote justice in simple proceedings." Hagler, 118 Idaho 599, 798 P.2d 58 
(1990). 
The Claimant respectfully notes that also in regards to the statement by the Defendant's--
that this Court affirms that "if the Commission does not make a correct and proper application of 
the law in regards to the evidence on record, the Court can overturn the erroneous conclusion." 
Blayney v. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P2d 972 (1986). 
The Claimant has provided substantial expert medical and personal testimony that 
supports her appeal that she was not MMI on November 21, 2007 to "a reasonable degree of 
medical probability." Langley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 
P.2d 732 (1995). The Court defines "probable as having more evidence for than against." Fisher 
v. Bunker Hill Company, 96 Idaho 341, 344, 528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). 
The Claimant contends that the Commission has not met the Court's evidence standard to 
support their conclusion-that Commission erred as a matter of law and abused their discretion 
when they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted. 
The Claimant therefore submits this additional legal contention in her appeal to this Court 
that she was not MMI on November 21, 2007 rather has been in a "state of recovery" from the 
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date of her work-related injury on May 1, 2006 up to the date Judge Molleur stated that she was 
disabled on November 25, 2008." (Cl.Ex. D, p. 1 ). 
Additional Argument as to Why: 
II. The Claimant respectfully contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law or 
abused their discretion when they did not make a correct and proper application of the 
law to the evidence submitted when they denied the Claimant ongoing medical benefits 
that are causally related to her work-related injury 
The Claimant has already provided substantial evidence in her Appellate Brief to this 
Court that the "injury for which benefits are claimed is casually related to the work-related 
accident." Wichterman v. J.H. Kelley, Inc., 144 Idaho 138, 158, P .3d 301 (2007). 
Therefore, the Claimant will not "rehash" this submitted evidence and would respectfully 
note her legal contentions already stated regarding the MMI status opined by Dr. Greenwald. 
The Defendant's also again bring up the issue that authorization for care from surety was 
never requested for subsequent physicians. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 23 ). The Claimant has 
already discussed that she did seek additional help from surety after the MMI date of November 
21, 2007. This issue is again discussed by the Claimant in her Opening Brief to this Court. ( S.C. 
App. Opening Brief, p. 19, 20 ). 
The Defendant's state on May 23, 2007 over a year after the reported industrial injury, 
Dr. Greenwald was still unable to see "why the Claimant experienced pain." ( Def. Ex. F, p. 78 ). 
It is stated that the Claimant continued to report her condition as worsening even though 
additional MRI's showed no change in the Claimant's condition. (Def.Ex. D, p. 41 ). 
The Defendant's erroneously assert that Dr. Krafft opined the Claimant had "a perceived 
level of severe disability not an actual disability." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 23 ). Upon 
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examination of the actual report from Dr. Krafft in his IME it will be noted that under the 
heading of "Discussion" he states "the Claimant has a current perception of severe disability"-
however, Dr. Krafft makes "absolutely no statement" that "he opined the Claimant had a 
perceived level of severe disability not an actual disability." (Def.Ex. I, p. 115 ). Again this is 
another "erroneous "fact" by the Defendant's that is offered as evidence to this Court. 
The Defendant's assert that the Claimant denied her fibromyalgia condition during her 
appointment with Dr. Krafft. ( S .C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 23 ). Upon review of this Exhibit I, Dr. 
Kraft does not mention any denial of fibromyalgia by the Claimant. Dr. Krafft does state in the 
section labeled "Discussion" "this is a 53 year old left-handed female with a long-standing 
history of fibromyalgia ... " ( Def. Ex. I, p. l l 5 ). Regarding any preexisting history, Dr. Krafft 
states that the Claimant denies any previous problems or injuries, including any other work or 
liability related injuries. Ms. Shubert also denies having any difficulties similar to those she is 
now experiencing until the injury. ( Def. Ex. I, p. 108, 109 ). 
Regarding the fibromyalgia issue, the Claimant has fully discussed this in her Opening 
and Response Brief to the Industrial Commission. ( LC. Cl. Opening Brief, p. 9, 15/ LC Cl. Resp. 
Brief, p. 5, 6 ). The Claimant would respectfully state to this Court that in the Claimant's Exhibit 
E which contains her medical insurance claims submitted from 2004 to 2011-there is no 
diagnostic code for fibromyalgia mentioned. ( Cl. Ex. E ). Chronic fibromyalgia means that it is 
an ailment that is recurring and lasting for a long time-again there is nothing recorded in her 
prior medical history of this long-lasting medical condition. The Claimant's insurance carriers 
during this time verified that there are "diagnosis medical codes for fibromyalgia" yet there are 
no diagnostic codes listed for this condition in all the 7 years of the medical records she 
submitted from her insurance providers. ( Cl. Ex. E ). 
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The first mention of this "chronic fibromyalgia" was with Dr. Lossman on October 11, 
2006 where he records "fibromyalgia, this is chronic. She (Claimant) did not tell me about this at 
the last visit only she told the physical therapist about this." ( Cl. Ex. Fl Dr. Lossman. 
10111/2006, p. 1 ). 
The Claimant contends in her hearing before Referee Powers that she did not state to the 
physical therapist or Dr. Greenwald that she had fibromyalgia ... Mr. Day, "Well you 
understand that Dr. Lossman, whether he got it from you or whether he got it from his own 
medical conclusion, that it was his assessment, that you had fibromyalgia and he put that in his 
chart notes." Mrs. Shubert, "Yes, I understand." ( Tr., p. 44, L. 20-25; p. 43, L. 1-25). Mr. Day, 
"Alright, and so when you went from Primary Health over to Idaho Physical Medicine, where 
Dr. Greenwald was, did you tell her that you had had some problems with injuries and pain prior 
to the accident at Macy's?" Mrs. Shubert (Claimant), "Yes, injury and pain in my neck and my 
one shoulder." ( Tr., p. 44, L. 1-8). 
Let it be noted that there was no mention of any prior fibromyalgia issue or sciatica left 
leg lumbar spine L4-L5-S 1 injuries in any of her medical records until Dr. Lossman' s report. ( 
Cl. Ex. Fl Dr. Lossman. 10111/2006, p. 1 )(Cl.Ex. E ). 
Also it is very important to note that the Claimant could find no diagnosis or reference to 
her quote "fibromyalgia condition" outside of workman's compensation doctors or referrals they 
made to other medical personal. The Claimant reviewed medical reports from Dr. Schwartsman, 
Dr. Frizzell, Judge Molleur, Dr. Casper, and Dr. Ricks and she could find no mention of 
fibromyalgia. ( Cl. Ex. Fl Dr. Schwartsman. 0612612008; Dr. Frizzell. 07131/2008; Dr. Ricks 
06/1412012 )(Cl.Ex. D, p. 1-6 ). 
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The Claimant's legal issue is not whether she had "prior injuries in her neck, shoulder, 
and thoracic area" or the terminology used by a workman's comp treating physicians--her legal 
contention on appeal to this Court is that her work-related injury on May 1, 2006 resulted in 
increasing intense pain with severe limiting physical impairments that resulted in her disability 
and inability to gainfully work. 
Under the section "Current Status" Dr. Krafft noted the examinee's chief complaint is 
pain in the left hip with burning in the ankle and cramping in the leg. She describes this as a 
stabbing sensation. The pain is reported as constant. ( Def. Ex. I, p. 111 ). 
In the very next section of Dr. Krafft' s Independent Medical Examination Report-under 
"Causation"--Dr. Krafft opines "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there is a causal 
relationship between the examinee's (Claimant) current complaints and the reported injury." 
(Def.Ex. I, p. 111,115). 
In this same IME report Dr. Krafft states "the examinee (Ms. Shubert/Claimant) has not 
achieved maximum medical improvement." (Def.Ex. I, p. 116 ). 
The Defendant's also assert that the Claimant had made no improvements and there was 
"no diagnostic or objective medical" evidence to warrant additional treatment or support her 
claims of increasing pain. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 21).The Defendant's further assert that the 
fact that the Claimant is "subjectively symptomatic" did not require the Commission to 
determine she is entitled to additional medical benefits. ( S.C Def. Resp. Brief, p. 22 ). 
The Defendant's state that physical examination, diagnostic reports, and previous chart 
notes from other physicians offered no support that the Claimant had any "objective evidence of 
discomfort." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 21, 22 ). 
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The Defendant's assert the fact Claimant is subjectively symptomatic did not require the 
Commission to determine she is entitled to additional medical benefits. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, 
p. 22 ). Therefore the Defendant's are contending that they are not be responsible for her "on-
going medical benefits" because she is quote "MMI" and that since her pain is subjective it is 
therefore not casually related to her work-related accident. 
The Claimant would submit the following "objective evidence" that casually connects her 
pain to her work-related accident on May 1, 2006. This is not a "rehashing of the evidence" but 
to show her legal contention with the erroneous conclusions by the Industrial Commission and 
with the "generalities" submitted as "fact" by the Defendant's in their Responsive Brief to this 
Court. The Defendant's allege "physical examination, diagnostic reports, and previous chart 
notes from other physicians offered no support that the Claimant had any objective evidence of 
discomfort." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 21, 22 ). 
The Claimant would ask the Court to respectfully consider the following "objective 
medical evidence" before and after her proposed MMI date that supports her legal appeal to this 
Court. 
• On October 25, 2006, Dr. Diana Newton, MD/ Advanced Open Imaging did an MRI on 
the Claimant and her findings showed: L4-5 annulus bulge. High-intensity zone along the 
left dorsolateral disk margin compatible with an annular tear. ( Cl. Ex. Fl Advanced Open 
Imaging. 10/25/2006. p. 1-2 ). 
• Additionally on May 24, 2007 Dr. Anthony Giaupue, MD/ Intermountain Medical 
Imaging did an MRI and reported the Impression: At L4-5 there is a broad based disk 
bulging associated with fissuring or tearing of the left foraminal/far lateral annular fibers. 
( CL Ex. F/ Intermountain Medical Imaging. 05/24/2007. p. 1 ) 
• Dr. Kevin Krafft, MD, on August 9, 2007 in his IME report of Ms. Shubert (Claimant) 
notes Ms. Shubert denies having any difficulties similar to those she is now experiencing 
until the injury (p.4). Dr. Kraft noted in his Medical Record Review that 11-22-06 MRI 
showed an L4-5 annular disc tear without herniated nucleus pulposus or nerve root 
impingement. He notes additionally that MRI studies from 05-24-2007 again show broad 
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based disc bulge at L4-5 with fissuring and tearing of the far left annulus fibers. ( Cl. Ex. 
Fl Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. 08/09/2007. p. 1,4,5,6,10,12 ). 
• Dr. Krafft, MD, on August 9, 2007 noted the examinee's (Ms. Shubert) chief complaint is 
pain in the left hip with burning in the ankle and cramping in the leg. She describes this 
as a stabbing sensation. She notes that her pain is worsened with walking, sitting down, 
lying down, bending, and improved by changing position. The pain is reported as 
constant. ( Cl. Ex. Fl Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. 08/09/2007. p. 6 ). 
• Dr. Krafft, states also on August 9, 2007 in his IME Report of Ms. Shubert (Claimant) 
that "the examinee (Ms. Shubert) has not achieved maximum medical improvement. ( Cl. 
Ex. F/Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. 08/09/2007. p. 11 ). 
• Dr. Krafft on August 9, 2007 also states regarding causation that to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty, there is a causal relationship between the examinee's (Ms. Shubert) 
current complaints and the reported injury. ( Cl. Ex. Fl Boise Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation. 08/09/2007. p. 10 ). 
• Dr. Krafft, on August 13, 2007 in a letter to Marsha Gregory/ Liberty Northwest 
Insurance/ stated in regards to the issue "is this accident the cause of her symptoms"-
notes on a more probable than not basis, her current symptoms are likely the result of her 
accident. She describes falling on her left leg, which is a reasonable mechanism to cause 
her left SI joint dysfunction. The annular tear also could reasonably result from this 
injury. (Cl.Ex. Fl Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. 08/13/2007. p. 1 ). 
• Dr. Roman Schwartsman on June 26, 2008 notes regarding the Claimant (Ms.Shubert) 
complaint left hip and leg pain. She has radiating pain down the back of the leg and into 
the lateral calf and into the foot. The MRI shows a broad-based disc bulge and fissuring 
of the lateral annular fibers. The pathology is on the left side at L4-5 which correlates 
with the location of the patient's symptoms specifically the weakness and radiation of her 
pain ... I do however feel that the majority of her symptoms are coming from her lumbar 
spine specifically the annular tear. This correlates with the dermatomal location of her 
pain. (Cl.Ex. Fl Dr. Roman Schwartsman. 06/26/2008. p. 1-2) 
• Dr. Roy Frizzell, MD, Ph.D. Certified American Board of Neurological Surgery, stated 
on July 31, 2008. Past Medical History to my understanding no significant lumbar 
injuries or left lumbar pain with leg radiation. Review of symptoms ... burning, 
cramping and numbness down the left leg. MRI lumbar spine. L4-5 bilateral annular tear. 
Left- sided annular tear L4-5, tear of labrum, disk protrusion at the left L4-5. Causation: 
It is my medical opinion, on a more probable than not basis that Ms. Shubert's ongoing 
left-sided low back, left hip and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006. 
I do not believe Ms.Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time. ( Cl. Ex. 
F/Dr. Roy Frizzell. 07/31/2008. p. 1-4) 
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• Dr. Roy Frizzell, MD, Ph.D. on December 12, 2008 stated he had spoken with Dr. Sandra 
Thompson regarding LuAnn Shubert's (Claimant) spinal stimulator trial ... based on my 
medical opinion, on a more probable than not basis, Ms. Shubert's ongoing left-sided low 
back, left hip and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006. (Cl.Ex. Fl 
Dr. Roy Frizzell. 12/04/2008. p. 1 ) 
• Dr. John Casper MD on June 11, 2009 did a consultative examination with the Claimant 
and opined that the Claimant should not lift or carry more than 25 lbs, and more 
significantly, he opined that she would have difficulties in prolonged standing and 
walking due to her low back pain (Cl.Ex. D, p. 5) 
• Judge Molleur/ Administrative Law Judge/Social Security/ on March 29, 2011 stated 
after careful review of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the Claimant has been 
disabled from November 25, 2008 ( CL Ex. D, p. 1 ) 
• Judge Molleur/Administrative Law Judge/Social Security/ on March 29, 2011 stated at 
the hearing the Claimant testified extensively regarding her impairments and limitations. 
Overall, she described a lifestyle limited by pain. She further testified that she worked at 
Macy's for seven years, and stopped when her pain became too great ( CL Ex. D, p. 4 ) 
• Judge Molleur/Administrative Law Judge/Social Security/on March 29, 2011 stated that 
medical record supports the Claimant's allegation of disabling impairments. The 
Claimant's onset of disability was preceded by a work-related injury when she tripped 
and fell on May 1, 2006. Since that time, she has complained of radiating pain down the 
back of her leg. Dr. Schwartzman noted that she had annular tears at L4-5 which 
correlated with the location of the Claimant's symptoms, specifically the weakness and 
radiation. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 4 ) 
The Claimant contends that in regards to the above offered "objective evidence" the 
Commission legally erred in regards to its erroneous conclusion that the Claimant is not entitled 
to medical benefits that are casually related to her work-related injury on May 1, 2006. ( R., p. 
23). 
The lawful role of the Commission is "finder of fact." Idaho Const. Art V section 9. This 
Courts review is generally limited to questions of law. Id. However, if the findings of the 
Commission are not "supported by substantial competent evidence, they are not binding and 
conclusive and should be appealed for review. Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161,540 P.2d 
1337, 1340 (1975). In such instances, the finding of fact will be set aside on appeal. Id. 
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The Court has stated that "no magic" words are necessary when a physician plainly and 
unequivocally conveys his or her conviction that events are causally related." Paulson v. Idaho 
Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 901, 591 P.2d 143, 148 (1979). 
Also in regards to "objective evidence "connecting her pain to her work-related injury it 
is stated on the Workman's Compensation website regarding an "annular tear" --the annulus is 
the fibrous ring of the disc structure which surrounds the centrally located soft nucleus of the 
disc. Tearing of the annulus can produce pain because the annulus has pain fibers within its 
structure. ( Cl. Ex. H, p. 1 ). 
The Claimant submits to this Court the following personal testimony accounts of 
individuals with similar injuries: ( Claimant Ex. H/ Steady Health.com. p.2/ Health Message 
Boards.com. p. 2 , 3 ). This evidence is respectfully offered to show other "objective evidence" 
that connects the Claimant's on-going pain to this type of injury in legal contention to the 
"generalities offered as fact" by the Defendant's to the Commission and to this Court. Note other 
individual's pain experience caused by L4/L5 annular tears: 
• I have been diagnosed as having Central annular tears at L3/L4 and L4/L5, which 
showed up in a MRI. My doctor advises me that nothing can be done and to just 
learn to live with the pain. I find this advise astonishing as I am in extreme pain 
every day and night 
• I also have a tear and it is agony ... the pain in my back is so bad at times I can't 
even put socks or shoes on, the only thing that has gave me any ease is to lie 
across the bed on my belly with a hot water bottle on my back. I have had this 
pain for 11 months now it is terrible I feel your pain 
• I as well have annular tears along my lower back. I get what I call locking of the 
lower back at times. What I mean by is that I can't stand up, walk, stand, sit or 
anything else. I get down in my back for several days. This has being going on for 
2 almost 3 years. I have done the injections and they seemed to help a little bit. .. 
I still have pain everyday and don't think that I can even go back to work. I am a 
very active person but, due to my back I don't have the ability to do the things I 
use to ... not sure what is gonna happen but, I am tired of living with back pain 
every day. 
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• I had a back injury while working and had a MRI that said I had slight disc bulge 
c-6. That wasn't what was causing all my pain then about 2 months later after 
telling the workers comp. doctor that it was not getting better then they did a 
thoracic MRI .. .I called my doctor and told her this she said here is some 
triamodol for pain I can't see you anymore comp. will not let me. I was in and out 
of the hospital for 8 months after that for extreme pain in lower and upper back ... 
I finally was able to afford to see my family doctor after being in the hospital 
again for pain. He ran an MRI on my lumbar spine that said L5Si disc buyldge 
with annular tear 
• I have an "early annular tear"-L4 and L5 with sciatic symptoms (pain in the butt 
and legs) & supposedly no disk herniation noted (from MRI) 
• I have been diagnosed with an annular tear in my 14/15 and 15/s 1. I am 24, my job 
is very active ... I'm in a 9/10 pain constantly, since march. 
These personal testimonials statements are given by people with similar "objective 
injuries" attesting to their actual ongoing pain from that injury. ( Claimant Ex. H/ Steady 
Health.com. p.2 / Health Message Boards.com. p. 2, 3 ). 
Idaho Code 72-432( 1) protects employees mandating that employers provide necessary 
medical services for employees injured on the job. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Edmondson, 
130 Idaho 108,111,937 P.2d 420,423 (1997). 
The Claimant would ask the Court to consider this preponderance of expert medical and 
additional substantial and credible "objective medical evidence" she has submitted regarding her 
on-going severe pain after her proposed MMI date. This objective evidence supports her legal 
appeal to this Court that she is entitled to medical benefits and reimbursement of her out-of-
pocket personal expenses that were casually related to her work-related injury after the proposed 
MMI date due to her on-going pain and disability from her work-related injury on May 1, 2006. 
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Additional Argument as to Why: 
III. The Claimant respectfully contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law or 
abused their discretion when they did not make a correct and proper application of 
the law to the evidence submitted when they denied the Claimant total and partial 
temporary disability benefits 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 72-408, a claimant is entitled to income benefits for total and 
partial temporary disability during a period of recovery. When a claimant reaches a point of 
medical stability then he or she is no longer in a period of recovery and therefore the claimant's 
entitlement to temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits ceases. Jarvis v. Rexburg 
Nursing Center, 136 Idaho 579, 38 P .3d 617 (2001). 
The Defendant's assert that despite the Claimant's efforts to seek additional treatment 
after the date of the MMI, the Commission found none of these records are sufficient to 
challenge Dr. Greenwald's determination that the Claimant had reached a point of medical 
stability. ( R., p. 20 ). 
Again the Claimant contends that the Defendant's make an erroneous generality when 
they assert that there is no medical evidence supporting the Claimant's contention that she is 
entitled to additional TTD benefits. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 24 ). 
Regarding the Claimant's entitlement to additional temporary total or temporary partial 
disability benefits the Defendant's assert that while it is undisputed that the Claimant later treated 
with a number of physicians,--the legal contention arise with their assertion that "none of them 
opined she was in a period of recovery, took her off work, or offered additional restrictions." 
(S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 24 ). 
In regards to this erroneous statement-- Dr. Krafft MD stated in his IME report of Ms. 
Shubert (the Claimant) on August 9, 2007 that the examinee (Claimant) has "not reached 
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maximum medical improvement." ( Cl. Ex. Fl Dr. Krafft/ Boise Physical Medicine & 
Rehabilitation Clinic. 08/09/2007, p. 11 ). If the Claimant has not reached MMI status-she 
must be in a "period of recovery." 
Let it be noted that on July 31, 2008 Dr. Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. stated that "it is my 
medical opinion, on a more probable than not basis, Ms. Shubert's" ongoing" left-sided low 
back, left hip, and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006. I do not believe Ms. 
Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time." ( CL Ex. F, Dr. Roy Frizzell. 
07/31/2008 p. 1-4 ). 
Dr. Frizzell's expert opinion was given almost a full year after Dr. Krafft's IME and he 
still opined that the "Claimant had not reached maximum medical stability." ( Cl. Ex. F, Dr. Roy 
Frizzell. 07/31/2008 p. 1-4 ). Since Dr. Frizzell opined "Ms. Shubert (the Claimant) was not 
MMI"-she must be in a "period of recovery" because she was not medically stable. Id. 
Therefore in Referee Power's reference to Idaho Code 72-408 where it states that a 
claimant is entitled to income benefits for total and partial temporary disability during a "period 
of recovery" --the Claimant should be entitled these benefits. 
Let it also be noted that Judge Molleur "after careful review of the entire record the 
undersigned finds that the claimant has been disabled from November 25, 2008." ( CL Ex. D, p. 
l ). Therefore, since Judge Molleur determined in his expert medical opinion the Claimant was 
"disabled" -she would certainly not be "medical stable" (MMI) and would therefore be in a 
"period of recovery" up to the time he found the Claimant disabled on November 25, 2008. 
Therefore, again it is contended legally by the Claimant per Idaho Code 72-408 that she 
should be entitled to total and partial temporary disability benefits during this "period of 
recovery." 
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Dr. John Casper, MD on June 11, 2009, based upon his examination of the Claimant (Ms. 
Shubert) opined that the Claimant should not lift more than 25 lbs. More significantly, he opined 
that "she would have difficulties in prolonged standing and walking due to her low back pain." 
(Cl. Ex. D, p. 5 ). 
Again when the Idaho Code 72-408 is applied to Dr. Casper's expert opinion regarding 
the Claimant's medical status-she certainly was not in a state of "medical stability" as asserted 
by the Defendant's. Let it also be noted Dr. Casper did offer additional restrictions. (Cl.Ex. D, 
p. 5 ). Therefore, although Dr. Casper did not use the term "period of recovery"-he certainly 
described this condition in his assessment of the Claimant. 
Judge Molleur found in his expert medical opinion that such an inability to stand or walk 
for prolonged period is not consistent with exertion above the sedentary level. Therefore, the 
undersigned (Judge Molleur) accords Dr. Casper's findings significant weight. (Cl.Ex. D, p.5 ). 
The Defendant's assert in their Defendant's Responsive Brief to this Court regarding the 
Claimant's legal entitlement to total and partial disability benefits-- that the Claimant was given 
restrictions while working as a sales clerk and that Dr. Greenwald "encouraged" the Claimant to 
return to work and not to miss any time. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 24 ). They assert that "instead 
of abiding by the direction of her physicians, the Claimant appears to have determined what she 
felt her work status should be by informing Macy's what she could and could not do." ( S.C. Def. 
Resp. Brief, p. 24 ). 
First of all regarding the Defendant's asserted issue that the Claimant was missing work--
it should be noted that at the hearing Referee Power's asked the Claimant, "Did you miss any 
work between the time you fell and you first went to see a doctor? Claimant responded, "No your 
honor." ( Tr., p. 32, L. 1-2 ). Let it be noted that the Claimant did miss 4 hours of work sometime 
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after she saw Cory Huffine on August 31, 2006 and before she saw Dr. Greenwald on December 
11, 2006 because of pain. Dr. Greenwald states in a letter to Dr. Lossman on December 11, 2006 
"that at the end of the visit the patient states she missed four hours at work because of pain. I told 
her that I will not allow her to miss any work and because this is her first visit I will not write her 
an excuse." ( Def. Ex. F, p. 72 )( R., p. 9, 11 ). 
Also let it be noted Referee Power's again asked the Claimant, "Did Dr. Greenwald when 
she released you from her care indicate to you that you could return to work?" The Claimant 
response was, "I was never not working with her." Referee Powers, "I'm sorry." The Claimant, 
"She never not let me work. I always did work." Referee Powers, "She never took you off 
work?" The Claimant, "Right." ( Tr., p. 35, L. 21-35; p. 36, L. 1-4 ). Therefore, the Defendant's 
erroneously assert that the Claimant was "missing work." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 24). 
The Defendant's erroneously state "she returned to work in the same position; however, 
"she would not" work in the departments with heavier items such as rugs and mattresses." ( LC. 
Def. Resp. Brief, p. 6 ). The truth is that "they (management) would not put me in certain spots 
in the store." Per the record, Mr. Day asked the Claimant, "Can you explain to the Referee 
why?" The Claimant, "She (referring to the manager) wouldn't put me, like, in rugs and 
mattresses." Mr. Day, "Why wouldn't you be able to work near rugs with regard to the rugs?" 
The Claimant, "Oh they're heavy." ( Tr., p. 37, L. 15-25 ). The Claimant was abiding by her 
work restrictions contrary to the erroneous assertion by the Defendant's. 
The Defendant's also assert that "instead of abiding by the direction of her physicians the 
Claimant appears to have determined what she felt her work status should be by informing 
Macy's what she could and could not do." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 24 ). 
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The Defendant's assert "she wouldn't work" is a distortion of the truth. The full truth is 
that "they (the managers) wouldn't even put me in shoes which sounds kind of weird but-well, 
they did one time and I called and I said "I can't do it"-not "I will not" (as stated by the 
Defendant's Response Brief). The Claimant further states "and they're (the manager) like why, 
and I said because they're on metal racks and you have to move the metal racks and "I can't 
move them and they actually put me up in gift wrap a lot." ( Tr., p. 37, L. 15-25; p. 38, L. 1-22) 
( I.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 6 )( I.C. Cl. Resp. Brief, p. 6, 7 ). 
The Claimant's contention is not a matter of "she said he said" rather that her legal issue 
before this Court is that the Defendant's offer some of the same "erroneous generalities" before 
this Court that were submitted to the Industrial Commission. The Claimant's legal concern is that 
the Defendant's same "erroneous generalities" that were submitted to the Industrial Commission 
in their Defendant's Response Brief are now being offered as quote "factual evidence" to this 
Court. ( I.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 17). 
The Claimant's legal and just appeal to this Court is that she is aware that this Court will 
not set aside any "findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence," but 
that this Court does review questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and 
competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 
910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). 
The Claimant contends that "substantial and competent" evidence supports her legal 
appeal to this Court. The Court's definition of substantial and competent evidence is "relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic 
Clinic v. Idaho State Ins, Fund., 128 Idaho 161, 164,911 P .2d 754, 757 (1996). 
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Her legal contention with these continued "erroneous facts" is that if the findings of the 
Commission are not "supported by substantial and competent evidence, they are not binding and 
conclusive" and should be appealed for review. Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158,161,540 
P.2d 1337, 1340 (1975). 
The Claimant would respectfully ask this Court to review her Opening Brief and her 
Response Brief to the Industrial Commission in regards to her legal contention with the 
Defendant's submitted quote "facts." ( I.C. Cl. Opening Brief/ I.C. Cl. Resp. Brief ). 
The Claimant asserts that she is legally entitled to temporary total and temporary partial 
disability benefits because she was in a "state of recovery since her work-related injury on May 
1, 2006 up to November 25, 2008"-the date Judge Molleur opined that she was disabled as a 
result of her work-related injury. ( Cl. Ex. D. p. 1 ). 
The important legal issue is not simply a "rehashing of the facts" but that the Claimant is 
legally contending that the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when 
they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted when 
they denied the Claimant total and partial temporary disability benefits. 
Idaho Code 72-408 provides for income benefits for total and partial disability during an 
injured worker's "period of recovery." 
Additional Argument as to Why: 
IV. The Claimant respectfully contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law or 
abused their discretion when they did not make a correct and proper application of 
the law to the evidence submitted when they failed to conclude that the Claimant 
should be entitled to total permanent disability benefits 
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The Defendant's in their Responsive Brief to this Court assert that the Claimant wants the 
Court to consider the medical opinion of Social Security physician Dr. John Casper that the 
Claimant should not lift more than 25 lbs and would have difficulty with prolonged standing and 
walking due to her low back pain-that is true. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 25 ). 
The Claimant does want this Court to consider his expert medical opinion regarding her 
inability to stand or walk for prolonged periods. (Cl.Ex. D. p.5 ). The Defendant's asserted that 
the Claimant did not present evidence from any expert regarding disability in excess of 
impairment. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 26). 
Dr. John Casper, MD on June 11, 2009 after his examination of the Claimant (Ms. 
Shubert) opined that the Claimant should not lift more than 25 lbs. More significantly, he opined 
that "she would have difficulties in prolonged standing and walking due to her low back pain." 
( Cl. Ex. D, p.5). Judge Molleur found in his expert medical opinion that such an inability to 
stand or walk for prolonged period is not consistent with exertion above the sedentary level. 
Therefore, the undersigned (Judge Molleur) accords Dr. Casper's findings significant weight. 
(Cl. Ex. D, p.5 ). 
Per Idaho Code 72-101 (11) "Disability" means a "decrease in wage-earning capacity 
due to injury' or occupational disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical factor of 
physical impairment, and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430, Idaho 
Code. 
Dr. Casper's expert opinion certainly describes the Claimant's condition not as medically 
stable but actually "as a decrease in wage-earning capacity" because of her difficulties with 
prolonged standing and walking due to her low back pain related to her work-related injury. ( Cl. 
Ex. D, p. 5 ). 
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Dr. Casper's expert medical opinion is only a portion of the Claimant's preponderance of 
evidence to support her appeal to this Court that the Commission erred as a matter of law and 
abused their discretion in regards to their conclusions to the evidence she submitted. Dr. Casper's 
expert medical opinion "is expert medical opinion regarding disability in excess of impairment." 
( Cl. Ex. D, p. 5 ). 
The standard of the Court for witness testimony is that in regards to "testimony of a 
witness that neither the trial court nor a jury may arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the 
testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes of known law, if such testimony does 
not exceed probability." Jeffery v. Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 50 P.2d 872, 874). This submitted 
expert medical testimony by the Claimant is additional important substantial and credible 
evidence that she should be entitled to total permanent disability benefits. 
Let it also be recalled respectfully that the Commission legally failed in its role as "finder 
of fact" when they asserted that the "Claimant has produced no competing medical opinion from 
which any other assessment could be determined." ( R., p. 21, par.43 ). In regards to this 
erroneous statement-the Claimant did provide the above mentioned "competing medical 
opinion evidence" in her Exhibit D. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 5). In regards, however, to Defendant's recall 
of the assertion by the Commission that the Claimant has produced "no competing medical 
opinion"-that was respectfully shown to be an erroneous statement that was substantially and 
competently addressed in her Appellant Opening Brief to this Court. ( S.C. App. Opening Brief, 
p. 33 ). 
First of all the Commission stated that the Claimant did not present any evidence from 
any expert regarding disability in excess of impairment. ( R., p. 35, par 2 ). The Claimant 
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submitted in her Exhibit D (Social Security Disability Exhibit) evidence regarding disability in 
excess of impairment which the Claimant has clearly referred to. (Cl.Ex. D, p. 1, 4, 5 ). 
However, now that she has submitted the "competing medical opinion" of Dr. Casper--
the Defendant's then assert that this opinion only goes to the issue ofrestrictions and not to the 
Commission's overall evaluation of the Claimant's loss of access and retained ability to return to 
the work force. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 25, 26 ). 
The Defendant's state that the Commission appropriately considered the Claimant's 12th 
grade education, her writing and verbal skills, as well as her level of articulation and 
organization. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 26 ). As to the Claimant's writing, verbal, and 
articulation, and organizational skills just referred to--let it be noted that the Claimant did not 
write her Industrial Commission cases nor this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court--her husband 
does. He has a master's degree in counseling. He researches and writes the Claimant's cases for 
her. They are reviewed together, discussed, and any changes the Claimant deems important are 
drafted before she signs, dates, and submits them. 
Permanent disability results when "the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful 
activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental or marked 
change in the future can be reasonably expected." ( Idaho Code 72-423 ). 
Idaho Code 72-430 defines that the evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of 
the injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is 
affected by the medical factor of impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors. 
The test for determining whether the Claimant has suffered permanent disability greater 
than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, taken into conjunction with 
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nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment." Graybill v. 
Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). 
The determination of permanent disability is "focused on the claimant's ability to engage 
in gainful activity." Sund v. Gambrel, 127, Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329,333 (1955). Idaho Code 72-
425 requires the Commission to assess not just the Claimant's present ability to engage in gainful 
activity, but also her probable future ability. 
The Defendant's assert that the determination of disability is a question of fact left to the 
discretion of the Commission. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Ind., 136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 
(2002)( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 25). However, the Court affirms that if there are conclusions of 
fact which are clearly erroneous they should be appealed to this Court. Hughes v. Highland 
Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P 3d 1238 (2002). 
The Defendants further assert that the evidence the Claimant submitted regarding the 
ruling of the Social Security Administration that she was totally disabled does not establish total 
and permanent disability under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, 
p. 27 ). 
The Defendant's contend that a "major touchstone" for the Social Security system is 
whether the Claimant can perform "substantial gainful activity."" Idaho Worker's Compensation 
Law analyzes whether the Claimant is 100% totally and permanently disabled, that is, "unable to 
engage in any activity worthy of compensation."" Idaho Worker's Compensation Law analyzes 
the claimant's ability to perform work and to compete for jobs in the labor market." " Under 
Social Security rules, "substantial gainful activity" is defined by a "threshold of income, not 
physical exertion, capacity, nor labor market competitiveness." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). 
32 
The Defendant's state that Idaho Worker's Compensation Law looks to a claimant's 
ability to perform work and to compete for jobs in the labor market and that the Social Security 
System looks to a "claimant's income." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27). 
The Defendant's "assert that the following are the standards for determining disability:" 
( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). 
Idaho Workman's Comp: 
• Whether Claimant is 100% totally and permanently disabled 
• Defined as "unable to engage in any activity worthy of compensation" 
• Analyzes claimant's ability to perform work and to compete for jobs in the labor 
market 
Social Security system 
• Whether the claimant can perform "substantial gainful activity" 
• Which is defined as "a threshold of income", not physical exertion, capacity, nor 
labor market competitiveness 
• Look to a claimant's income 
The Claimant asserts that it is extremely relevant at this time to review Judge Molleur' s 
required steps of evaluation for determining whether or not the Claimant is disabled. 
Under authority of the Social Security Act, Judge Molleur/ Administrative Law Judge/ 
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review/ for the Social Security Administration had a five-
step sequential evaluation process to follow for determining whether or not the Claimant is 
disabled. ( Social Security Act, 20 CFR 404.1520(a)) (Cl.Ex. D, p.1 ). Judge Molleur's 
guidelines are "that the steps are to be followed in order and that if it is determined that the 
claimant is or is not disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation will not go 
forward to the next step." ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 1-2 ). 
Judge Molleur in step one must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial 
gainful work activity. Substantial gainful activity is defined as engaging in work activity that is 
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"both substantial and gainful." If the individual engages in SGA, she is not disabled regardless of 
how severe her physical or mental impairments are and regardless of her age, education, or work 
experience. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 2, 3 ). 
Judge Molleur noted that the Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful work 
activity since November 25, 2008. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 3 ). 
The Claimant notes that at her hearing she stated to Referee Powers that "I can no longer 
work because of my pain." ( Tr., p. 25, L. 22, 23 ). The Claimant was able to continue working 
from November 21, 2007 (proposed MMI date) up to around November 23rd or 24th , 2008/ at 
which time she could no longer work because of the pain and was placed on short-term 
disability. (Def.Ex. B, p. 6 ). During this period the Claimant was taking Norco which she 
stated helped her endure the pain and that she finally had to stop working because she was 
throwing up and had diarrhea from the pain. ( Tr., p. 39, L. 5-11 ). 
Judge Molleur states he finds the Claimant disabled from November 25, 2008. (Cl.Ex. 
D, p.1 ). The Claimant did not work because she wouldn't-it was because she could no longer 
work because of the on-going pain and severe impairments from her work-related injury on May 
1, 2006. ( Tr., p. 25, L. 22-25; p. 26, L. 1-3 ). 
The Defendant's assert that under Social Security rules "substantial gainful activity" is 
defined as "a threshold of income", not physical exertion, capacity, nor labor market 
competitiveness. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). Per Judge Molleur the definition of "substantial 
gainful activity" is work activity that is 'both' substantial and gainful. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 2 ). Judge 
Molleur does not mention any "threshold of income" in step one which deals with "substantial 
gainful work activity." ( CL Ex. D, p. 2, 3 ). 
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Judge Molleur did note that the Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful work 
activity since November 25, 2008 the determined onset date of her disability. He noted the 
Claimant's earnings record for the fourth quarter of 2008 and first and second quarters of 2009, 
yet in reference to this Judge Molleur noted the Claimant testified that she had received short-
term disability benefits, as well as payout of her accrued vacation time. "As such, the 
undersigned (Judge Molleur) finds that the claimant has not engaged in substantial and gainful 
'work activity' since November 25, 2008. (Cl.Ex. D, p. 3 ). 
The Defendant's assert that under Social Security rules "substantial gainful activity" is 
defined as "a threshold of income", not physical exertion, capacity, nor labor market 
competitiveness. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). The Claimant respectfully notes to this Court 
that in Judge Molleur's five step-sequential evaluation process for establishing disability-step 
one "substantial gainful activity" does not deal with physical exertion, capacity, nor labor market 
competitiveness. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 )( Cl. Ex. D, p. 2, 3 ). 
In step one of the Social Security Administrations evaluation process for disability, 
Judge Molleur's concern is whether the Claimant has engaged in substantial and gainful work 
activity not with an "income threshold." ( CL Ex. D, p. 2, 3 ). 
The Defendant's are correct when they state that "substantial gainful activity" does not 
deal with physical exertion, capacity, nor labor market competitiveness---because Judge Molleur 
will address these issues later in his evaluation process for determining the Claimant's disability. 
( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). 
Judge Molleur' s first step of five strictly deals with the concern-has the Claimant 
engaged in any work activity that is both substantial and gainful--that was his concern in step-
one of five. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 2, 3 ). 
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The Defendant's state that Idaho Workman's Compensation laws analyze whether the 
Claimant is 100% totally and permanently disabled--that is "unable to engage in any activity 
worthy of compensation." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). Arnold v. Splendid Bakery, 88 Idaho 
455,463,401 P.2d 271,276 (1965). The Defense further states that Idaho Worker's 
Compensation Law analyzes the claimant's ability to perform and to compete for jobs in the 
labor market. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ) 
Since the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law analyzes the claimant's ability to perform 
and to compete for jobs in the labor market to determine total and permanent disability the 
Claimant wishes to present to this Court Judge Molleur's findings. 
In regards to the severity of the Claimant's impairments, Judge Molleur in step two stated 
that "the undersigned must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable 
impairment that is "severe" or a combination of impairments that is "severe" ( 20 CFR 404. 
1520(c) (Cl.Ex. D, p. 2) "An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" within the 
meaning of the regulations if it significantly limits an individual's ability to "perform basic work 
activities." ( CL Ex. D, p. 2 ). Judge Moller's expert medical opinion was that "the medical 
record establishes these impairments as severe within the meaning of the Regulations because 
they cause "significant limitations in the Claimant's ability to perform basic work activities." 
(CL Ex. D, p. 3 ). 
The Defendant's assert that Idaho Worker's Compensation Law analyzes the claimant's 
ability to perform and to compete for jobs in the labor market. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). It 
would seem extremely significant and relevant that Judge Molleur stated that the Claimant's 
impairments " significantly limit the Claimant's ability to perform basic work activities." ( Cl. 
Ex. D, p. 3 ). How is she to perform and compete for jobs in the labor market when her work-
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related injury impairments significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities and 
therefore to compete in the labor market? 
The Defendant's also assert that the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law analyzes 
claimant's ability to perform work and to compete for jobs in the labor market and that the Social 
Security System looks to a claimant's income. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p. 27 ). 
Again in contention with the Defendant's inaccurate assertions regarding the Social 
Security Administration's steps to determination of disability, the Claimant also would like to 
refer to additional substantial and competent evidence regarding Judge Molleur's determination 
of the Claimant's disability. 
Judge Molleur states that he must determine whether the Claimant has the residual 
functional capacity to perform the requirements of her past relevant work. ( 20 CFR 404.1520(f)) 
(Cl.Ex. D, p. 2, 3, 4, 5). He asserts that if the Claimant has the residual functional capacity to do 
her past relevant work, the Claimant is not disabled. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 2 ) 
Judge Molleur stated that he reviewed the Claimant's impairments and limitations, her 
medical record that supported her allegations of disabling impairments, the numerous 
conservative and invasive treatment modalities the Claimant underwent, and functional capacity 
evaluation that lasted approximately 4 hours. Judge Molleur stated that "taking all these factors 
into consideration, the undersigned finds that the Claimant retains the residual functional 
capacity for only sedentary work." (Cl.Ex. D, p. 4, 5 ). 
Judge Molleur also refers to the impartial vocational expert's opinion (Anne F. Aastum) 
who appeared and testified at the Claimant's Social Security Disability Hearing on February 16, 
2011. (Cl.Ex. D, p. 1, 5 ).The vocational expert described the claimant's past relevant work as 
a sales-clerk-women's apparel as a semi-skilled job performed at the light level of physical 
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exertion. Judge Molleur determined that the Claimant retains the residual functional capacity for 
only sedentary work, and also the demands of the Claimant's past-relevant work exceed her 
residual functional capacity. He further stated that he had considered the Claimant's age, 
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 1, 5 ). 
Referee Powers asserted that the test for determining whether a claimant has suffered a 
permanent disability greater than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, 
taken in conjunction with nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful 
employment." Graybill v. Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). 
(R., p.22, p. 44 ). 
Judge Molleur stated based on a residual functional capacity for the full range of 
sedentary work, considering the Claimant's age, education, and work experience, a finding of 
"disabled" is directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14. (Cl.Ex. D. p. 6 ). 
The Defendant's assert that the "focus and criteria by which the systems determine 
disability is entirely different." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p.27 ). If the systems are "entirely 
different" as asserted by the Defendant's, then may this Court respectfully note that Judge 
Molleur also had to consider whether the Claimant was still engaged in substantial and gainful 
employment; whether there was severe physical impairment; he had to determine her residual 
functional capacity; whether she can do her past relevant work; whether she can do any other 
work considering her residual functional capacity. He had to review her medical history. He had 
to consider nonmedical factors, age and vocational adversities, and the reduced capacity of the 
claimant for gainful employment. ( Cl. Ex. D, p. 2-7 ). 
Again referring to Referee Powers--the test for determining whether a claimant has 
suffered a permanent disability greater than permanent impairment is "whether the physical 
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impairment, taken in conjunction with nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity 
for "gainful employment." Graybill v. Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293,294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 
(1988). (R., p.22, p. 44 ). 
The Defendant's asserted that the systems for determining disability are "entirely 
different." ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p.27 )( Cl. Ex. D, p. 1-6 ). Yet, when both systems for 
determining disability are compared to the evidence just submitted by the Claimant-they appear 
to be very similar contrary to the assertion by the Defendant's. ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, p.27)( Cl. 
Ex. D, p. 1-6) 
The legal importance of this is that if there are conclusions of fact which are clearly 
erroneous they should be appealed to this Court. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48, 
P 3d 1238 (2002). This Court has also asserted that when "generalities are considered as fact, 
particularly when a factual issue is closely contended, a case should be reconsidered to the fact 
finder for reconsideration of relevant issues without errors." Kele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 
127 Idaho 681, 905 P2d 82 (Idaho App 1995). 
The Claimant respectfully contends that this additional evidence presented in this 
Appellant Reply Brief along with the substantial and competent expert medical and personal 
testimonial evidence submitted in her Opening Brief to this Court-- that she should be entitled to 
total disability benefits. 
The Claimant contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their 
discretion when they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence 
submitted when they failed to conclude that the Claimant should be entitled to total permanent 
disability benefits. 
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Permanent disability results when "the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful 
activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental or marked 
change in the future can be reasonably expected." (Idaho Code 72-423). 
The Claimant respectfully makes this appeal to this Court because of the total loss of her 
earning capacity in the labor market due to her work-related injury on May 1, 2006 and her 
resulting disability. 
Additional Argument as Why: 
V. The Claimant respectfully contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law or 
abused their discretion when they did not make a correct and proper application of 
the law to the evidence submitted when they concluded that the Claimant was able 
to enter the labor market at her hearing 
The Claimant additionally legally contends that the determination of permanent disability 
is "focused on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity." Sund v. Gambrel, 127, Idaho 
3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1955). Idaho Code 72-425 requires the Commission to assess the 
Claimant's "present ability and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity." 
The Court states the word "present" implies that the Commission is to consider the 
claimant's ability to work as of the time evidence is received. Per the Court there is no "present" 
opportunity for the Commission to make its determination apart from "the time of the hearing." 
The Court asserts that it is the claimant's personal and economic circumstances at the time of the 
hearing, not at some earlier time, that are relevant to the disability determination. Davaz v. Priest 
River Glass Co. Inc., 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296. 
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One of the continued legal arguments in the Claimant's appeal to this Court is that at the 
time of her hearing before Referee Powers on November 13, 2012 the Claimant's status was 
"disabled" as a result of her work-related injury. ( CL Ex. D, p. 1 )( Tr., p. 1 ). 
It is important to note that the Claimant has offered substantial and competent evidence 
from medical experts and personal witness testimony that opines that she has a actual 
disability-not perceived disability as a result of her work-related injury. This work-related 
disability has left her with an inability to work in the labor market; therefore, she has lost her 
wage earning capacity. 
The test for determining whether the Claimant has suffered permanent disability greater 
than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, taken into conjunction with 
nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment." Graybill v. 
Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293,294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). 
Judge Molleur stated that "based on a residual functional capacity for the full range of 
sedentary work, considering the Claimant's age, education, and work experience, he found the 
Claimant "disabled" since November 25, 2008. (Cl.Ex. D. p.6 ). 
The Claimant would also respectfully remind the Court of Dr. Casper's expert statements 
regarding the Claimant "that she would have difficulty in prolonged standing or walking due to 
her low back pain" (Cl.Ex. D, p.5 ); and Ms. Aastum's vocational expert professional opinion 
when she stated "as the Claimant retains the residual functional capacity for only sedentary 
work, the demands of the Claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional capacity" 
( Cl. Ex. D. p. 3, 5, and 6 ). 
Judge Molleur acknowledged the personal testimony statements provided by Inga 
Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry Wood. He stated, "Although not medically trained, these 
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statements provide insight into the severity of the Claimant's impairments and how those 
impairments affect the Claimant's ability to function. As such, the undersigned accords great 
weight to these statements." ( CL Ex. D. p. 5 ). 
The Claimant contends that she has submitted substantial and competent evidence that 
supports her appeal to this Court. The determination of permanent disability is "focused on the 
claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity." Sund v. Gambrel, 127, Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 
333 (1955). Idaho Code 72-425 requires the Commission to assess not just the Claimant's 
present ability to engage in gainful activity, but also her probable future ability. 
The Claimant respectfully contends that she submitted substantial and competent 
evidence "at the time of her hearing" before Referee Powers that supports her appeal that she is 
not able to work and has lost her wage earning capacity. Therefore, she has lost her access to the 
open labor market due to her disability resulting from her work-related injury on May 1, 2006. 
Therefore, she should be legally entitled to permanent disability benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's state that Surety has paid out $7, 768.75 in PPI benefits and $7,958.94 
in medical benefits on the Claimant's behalf for the May 1, 2006 injury ( S.C. Def. Resp. Brief, 
p. 6 ). The Claimant would respectfully state that she has $20,117 in out-of-pocket expenses 
casually related to her work-related injury not counting her lost wages, lost 401K and pension 
benefits-- let alone her personal on-going daily lifestyle significantly limited by pain and 
impairments. How does one put a price on that? ( CL Ex. G ). This all resulted from her "work-
related injury on May 1, 2006." 
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The Claimant's appeal to this Court is that she has submitted a preponderance of 
substantial and credible evidence that she contends legally supports her appeal that the Idaho 
Industrial Commission's conclusions are erroneous and not supported by the evidence standard 
of this Court. They have "one doctor" ... that opined the Claimant was MMI. 
The Claimant's legal appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court is that the Industrial 
Commission's "duty is to make a full and exhaustive inquiry." She contends that they erred as a 
matter of law and abused their discretion when they failed to administer the due process of 
justice that was due her--when they excluded credible evidence from an administrative law 
judge--when they capriciously disregarded expert medical opinion-when they excluded the 
testimony of personal credible witnesses-when they offered erroneous conclusions that are not 
supported by substantial and credible evidence. The Claimant respectfully appeals this-her case 
to the Idaho Supreme Court for a just and legal decision. She respectfully appeals to this Court 
her legal contention that she is entitled to the above mentioned benefits and reimbursements 
because of her work-related injury on May 1, 2006 that resulted in her disability. 
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